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Introduction 
The Privatisation process of State enterprises, in countries once being members of the 
Council for Mutual Economic Aid, is perceived as the main element of structural changes, 
leading to the economic system transformation and economic development. Although, 
privatisation cannot be understood as the main factor for the development of the market 
economy, however, its accomplishment influences the success of the other transformation 
elements, such as macro-economic stabilisation and economic activities’ liberalisation. 
Privatisation is a way of enforcing micro-economic changes in enterprises and introducing 
financial discipline. It gives a chance to increase productivity in the enterprises undergoing 
privatisation (as well as in economy) by establishing an atmosphere of competitiveness 
among them, and it also enables to eliminate subsidies (direct and indirect) from the State 
budget to an enterprise. 
The first hypothesis, undergoing verification in this study, states that the direct income 
from the privatisation, that is cash revenues flowing to the State budget  (or State 
organisations established in order to perform the privatisation), coming from the sale or 
lease of the State property, are of little importance in balancing the fiscal deficit, in Poland, 
the Czech Republic or Hungary, which has appeared during the transformation period in the 
said countries. 
Moreover, the increasing importance of indirect and direct income from privatisation 
in tempering the effects of the fiscal crisis in Poland, shall be the second hypothesis being 
verified in this study. Tax revenues from private sector enterprises
1 (including privatised 
State enterprises) constitute indirect income from privatisation. 
The condition of the State budget is the stimulating factor for the aim to achieve the 
highest income from privatisation in Poland and Hungary. In Poland, the income obtained 
from the sale of State enterprises to private investors becomes a direct income of the State 
budget or local budgets. A similar situation can be observed in Hungary, however the 
income transfer is performed parallel by two State organisations established to control the 
privatisation process - State Ownership Agency and State Holding
2. Nevertheless, in the 
Czech Republic, the pecuniary means obtained from the direct sale of State enterprises 
included in the grand privatisation, constitute the income of the National Ownership Fund (a 
State organisation established in order to conduct the privatisation) and they do not feed the 
State budget income, so practically they do not have any substantial meaning in balancing 
the fiscal deficit. 
 
                                              
1 This statement is reasonable if the definition of privatisation shall be understood very widely; that is 
the increase of the private sector share in the economy, and not only as a transfer of state enterprises to the 
private sector. 
2 In May 1995, the State Property Privatisation and Management Company were established in the 
place of State Ownership Agency and Holding. Income from the Privatisation of State Enterprises... 
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1: HYPOTHESIS 1: 
 
Independently from the privatisation methods used, the direct income obtained by the 
State budget from the State enterprises’ privatisation, is  insignificant and it is of small 
importance in balancing the budget in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. 
 
Table 1: Direct income obtained from the State enterprises' privatisation in Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary. (R - total budget income). 
   1991  1992  1993  1994 
Poland          % GDP       
% R                   
0,2 
0,8   
0,4 
1,5   
0,5 
1,7   
0,8 
2,5 
Hungary %  GDP 





















Sources: Fiscal Crisis Database and Luca Barbone MultiQuery Database: A Tool for Cross-
Country Comparisons, March 1995, M. Antczak "Zarys proces￿w prywatyzacyjnych w 
Republice Czech", CASE, Warsaw, November 1995. 
 
1.1. Initial macro-economic conditions and choosing the 
privatisation method. 
The choice of the right privatisation method is to serve the economic development and 
it should smooth the economic transformation effects. Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic chose quite different privatisation paths. The choice depended on the economic 
and political conditions that governed those countries at the threshold of the transformation 
process. The differences in the initial position were visible not only in the macro-economic 
results, but also in politics (besides visible differences in natural resources and the size of M. Antczak 
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the economies
3). While choosing the privatisation method, the attempt to the macro-
economic balancing of the economy has been regarded as a priority, more in Poland and 
Hungary than in the Czech Republic. The macro-economic disequilibrium state has been 
present during the period preceding the privatisation in Poland (due to the highest inflation) 
and in Hungary (the highest budget deficit). A negative balance in the central budget has 
been maintained in a wider scope in Hungary since 1991 than in Poland (see section 1.1.1), 
which leads to the public debt increase, and the increasing cost of servicing debts constitutes 
a serious threat to the condition of public finances. Thus, the proceedings leading to the 
budget deficit limitation are essential. The necessity to decrease the relative deficit (in 
regard to the GDP), causes that one of the most important macro-economic aspects of 
privatisation is its influence on the State budget condition. 
1.1.1. Poland.   
The central budget deficit amounted to USD 2.9 bln (equal to 3.7 % GDP) in Poland in 
1991. The comparative values for equivalent year in the Czech Republic - USD 0.4 bln (1.5 
% GDP), Slovakia - USD 0.3 bln (1.08 % GDP) and Hungary - USD 1.5 bln (4.22 % GDP). 
The above figures placed Poland in an unfavourable position,  forcing the acceptance of 
such reform rate and privatisation methods that would allow to obtain balance in a short 
period of time. Due to the budget deficit size, non-gratuitous privatisation was introduced, 
dominating over other methods of enterprise ownership transformation. The capital 
privatisation of one-person State Treasury companies, achieved by the direct sale of 
enterprises, ensures highest income to the budget, thus creating a chance to improve public 
finances condition 
Political factors have also played a significant role while choosing the privatisation 
method in Poland. The economic system change at the end of the eighties and the beginning 
of nineties caused the unions to gain control over a number of enterprises, and what is more, 
employees regarded themselves as heirs of particular State property enterprises. That in 
turn, resulted in complications of the privatisation process, especially of big industrial 
plants. This is the reason why the privatisation of State enterprises demanded a compromise 
with the self-government movement. The privatisation by liquidation, with widely used 
lease
4, became a very popular form of privatisation in regard to small and medium 
                                              
3 The size of the economy has its weak and strong points. If the economy is weaker, there is a bigger 
possibility that western investments shall have bigger impact on the performance of the transformation 
process due to the greater share of foreign capital in the privatisation. Such conditions, together with good 
micro-economic effects of enterprises and a long-term tradition of co-operation with Western Europe 
countries, were created in Hungary. Simultaneously, the small size of the economy, discourage investors due 
to the small size of the domestic market. 
4 Leasing a is technique of financing investments, which gives the investor of the estate owned by the 
State Treasury a possibility to use it. It can deal with the enterprises’ property in whole, or with its 
independent parts. The States remains the owner, keeping the rights of ownership, and it bears the attached 
financial risk, as the commercial risk, connected with the enterprises’ activity, is transferred to the lessee of 
the property. The attractiveness of the lease is enforced by the fact that it allows the commencement of the 
economic activity with a small value of own capital. Income from the Privatisation of State Enterprises... 
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enterprises, in that situation. A maximum of 20 % of employees shares has been anticipated 
for the enterprises where capital privatisation (sale of shares to employees at preferential 
price) was used.  
The highest in Central Europe inflation rate, amounting to 250 %, was registered at the 
threshold of economic reforms in Poland, in 1990. The high inflation level hindered the 
process of enterprises’ evaluation, of those assigned for privatisation and of the property 
remaining as State property. They real value underwent depreciation in time necessary for 
the performance of negotiations while selling the company; sometimes they lasted as long 
as 18 months. 
The differences in initial macro-economic situations were also linked with the size of 
State ownership. In 1989, in Czechoslovakia it was almost 100 % of the national property, 
in Hungary about 90 %, and in Poland 70 %
5. Excluding the agricultural sector, State 
ownership covered 90 % of production, and 85 % of investments were of public character in 
Poland in 1989. In 1991, the participation of the non-agricultural private sector increased to 
24 % GDP, where the main part played retail trade and building industry. In 1990, about 38 
% of the working population (outside agriculture) was employed by the private sector. At 
the end of 1990, when the process of ownership transformation began, 8441 State 
enterprises existed. After three years, in 2385 cases the privatisation has been concluded, 
and 1238 agricultural enterprises were transferred to the State Treasury Agricultural 
Ownership Agency
6. 
In the early nineties, Poland has been abundant in cheap working force, but lacking 
capital. As a result, such fields of production developed where the cheap production factor 
could be taken advantage of. In Poland it was retail trade, where the highest concentration 
of employment in the private sector was observed. 
1.1.2. Hungary. 
The list of Hungarian trumps was a little bit longer, in comparison with the Polish 
ones, at the initial point. Thanks to the reforms introduced  systematically since 1968, the 
situation in Hungary at the threshold of system changes was not as complicated as it was in 
Poland. Both targets of the transformation (macro-economic balance and institutional 
changes) were treated parallel as priority. 
In Hungary, the introductory restructurisation of enterprises and their wider autonomy 
were introduced by transformation. That is why the performance of enterprises was much 
more similar to the market economy model, in comparison with Poland or Czechoslovakia. 
The increase in autonomy of the State enterprises caused restructurisation processes from 
                                              
5 Due to private agriculture sector. 
6 ￿Prywatyzacja przedsiebiorstw państwowych￿ according to the data on December 31, 1993, 
published by GUS (Central Statistical Office). M. Antczak 
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the ranks, especially dealing with organisational structures
7. State enterprises reacted with 
flexibility to the changing surroundings, contrary to the passive  behaviour typical for Polish 
State enterprises. Thus, the private sector (excluding agriculture) was the widest. As a result 
of commenced reforms, the Hungarian economy system was much closer to the market 
economy model. 
The Hungarian government was very concerned about repaying interior debts while 
introducing privatisation programme. It can be illustrated in the following manner - if the 
estimated book value of the enterprise amounted to about 1800 - 2000 bln HUF in 1991
8, 
then the local authorities were to receive 300 - 335 bln, and 100 to 265 bln were to be 
assigned for the enterprise’s creditors, prior owners, in the form of compensation, for 
employees’ subventions, covering cost of ecological damage, and public purposes. The 
government wanted to assign 1400 bln HUF (78 - 70 %) for the repayment of interior debts 
and for covering privatisation expenses. In 1993, the government intended 62 % of the total 
gross income from privatisation, which is almost equal to the government’s prior 
assumptions
9, for the above. 
Hungarian government, facing the existing macro-economic conditions and the 
necessity to repay interior and foreign debts, decided to introduce the capital privatisation
10, 
as a dominant over other ways of privatisation and, thus,  ensuring the highest income to the 
State budget as a result of enterprises’ transformation. 
1.1.3. Czechoslovakia. 
The intervention of the Warsaw Pact forces, after the "Prague Spring", in 1968, 
scheduled Czechoslovakian economy for central planning in the highest extent among the 
three subject countries
11. Such conditions did not allow any place for the private initiative, 
and there was no talk about autonomy for enterprises. Czechoslovakia has the least 
experience in the introduction of reforms among all the three countries. Besides, it 
represented the highest level of industry concentration in huge plants. With the long 
tradition of conservative fiscal policy, the economy of Czechoslovakia reached the best 
macro-economic results in Eastern Europe at the end of the eighties. The inflation was 
below 4 % yearly, there was a strong positive balance of payments and a small (in 1991      
                                              
7 In Hungary, the so-called holding structures and ￿common ownership￿, that came into existence at 
the threshold  (or prior) of transformation processes, were the most characteristic ones. 
8 OECD, 1991, page 107. 
9 State Property Agency, October 1993. 
10 Many joint-venture companies were established in Hungary. Their character was not very much 
different from the Polish liquidation path. 
11 Among the Eastern Europe countries, central planning was most clearly visible in Eastern Germany. Income from the Privatisation of State Enterprises... 
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USD 8.8 bln
12) foreign debt, and most important, the lowest budget deficit among the 
countries of the Wyshegrad Group (in 1991, USD 0.4 bln for the Czech Republic, USD 0.3 
bln for Slovakia). 
  The macro-economic results mentioned above won for Czechoslovakia the first prize 
among the countries of the Wyshegrad Group. Thus, Czechoslovakia had the biggest chance 
for the market reforms to be successful. On the other hand, Czechoslovakian enterprises 
were not as well prepared for the acceptance of the market economy management rules, as 
they were in Poland or in Hungary.  The change of the economic system, then the aim to 
balance the economy (with low inflation and small budget deficit), was much more 
important for Czechoslovakia. 
 The macro-economic conditions caused that the government of Czechoslovakia 
decided to introduce mass privatisation way of enterprises’ transformation, as dominant over 
the other methods of privatisation. Due to the small budget deficit, there was no need for it 
to be balanced using marginal (in relation to the capital privatisation) revenues, that the 
method ensured. However, there was a need for structural reforms, as well as the necessity 
for the participation of all citizens in the privatisation process. That is why, the voucher 
privatisation, which possesses highest educational values, has been introduced as quickly as 
possible and with the biggest success in Czechoslovakia. 
  However, the need for the full restructurisation of enterprises has not been recognised 
in the Czech Republic, thus the role of foreign investors while choosing the privatisation 
strategy  was underestimated. 
 
1.2. Direct income from privatisation in Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary. 
  The revenues in cash flowing to the State budget (or State organisations established 
in order to perform privatisation processes), originating from the sale or lease of State 
property, can be accounted for direct income from privatisation. 
1.2.1. Poland. 
  The privatisation of State enterprises in  Poland, taking into consideration income to 
the central budget, is based on the following legal acts: 
- Resolution issued on July 13, 1990, concerning State enterprises privatisation (Journal 
of Law of 1990, No. 51, point 298; and of 1991, No. 60, point 253), 
- Resolution issued on February 5, 1993, concerning ownership transformation of 
enterprises holding special place in the economy of the State. 
                                              
12 Estimation according to the Statistical Bulletin, Central Statistical Office 1993/3. M. Antczak 
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Basing on the above mentioned legal acts, from the point of view of public finances, 
two basic procedures are being used for the State enterprises: 
1. Transformation of the enterprise into one-person State Treasury company and 
individual sale of shares or their contribution to the investment funds in order to 
perform privatisation. This method of privatisation has been called capital 
privatisation. 
2. Enterprise liquidation in order to sell its estate, contribute to the company or lease. 
This is the so-called privatisation by liquidation
13. 
In Poland, 844
14 enterprises were transformed into one-person State Treasury 
companies (359 of them into one-person State Treasury companies assigned for individual 
privatisation) during the years 1990 - 1994. According to the data on June 30, 1990, it 
constituted 7.2 % of all enterprises. 134 companies, 64 of them with foreign capital, have 
undergone privatisation using the capital method till the end of 1994. The highest number of 
companies that have undergone privatisation using the above mentioned method, was active 
in industry, transport and building industry. 
The State budget has been fed with single (or instalments) revenues obtained from the 
sale of enterprises, exceeding many times yearly revenues from those enterprises, as a result 
of the performance of the capital privatisation process during the years 1990 - 1994. Taking 
into consideration the financial condition of big industrial enterprises (80 % of the total 
number of companies were capital privatisation took place) and it’s systematic aggravation, 
the sum of single revenues can be regarded as a success (approx. 1 % of the total State 
budget income, and in 1994 - 1.34 %, Table 2). Besides, the revenues from taxes are higher 
from companies were privatisation took place than the average in the State’s economy, and 
it justifies a good long-term tendency. In 1992, a significant intensification of capital 
privatisation has been noticed. Shares or stocks of 46 companies have been sold, which 
constitutes 47 % of all companies where privatisation took place during the three years. The 
number of enterprises transformed into companies with the aim of their privatisation has 
been significantly lower in 1993 than in previous years (the revenues to the budget have 
also dropped), which showed that State enterprises waited for the organisation of common 
privatisation and for new legal acts describing the privatisation process. 
In 1993, the importance of the income obtained from the capital privatisation also 
dropped in the State budgetary revenues from 1.00 % in 1992 to 0.95 %. However, in 1994, 
the importance of the revenues obtained due to capital privatisation has crucially risen in the 
created GDP (with simultaneous increase of GDP) up to 0.4 %, whereas the share of 
revenues from capital privatisation in the total value of the budget income was the biggest in 
1994. 
                                              
13 In the new privatisation resolution project, the term ￿direct privatisation￿ has been replaced with 
liquidation privatisation. 
14 The data included in this paragraph has been laded from ￿Raport o prywatyzacji za 1994 r.￿ 
published by the Ministry of Ownership Transformation. Income from the Privatisation of State Enterprises... 
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  In the frames of the capital privatisation the income amounted up to 8468 bln PLZ in 
1994. The following elements constituted the above value: 
- sale of 36 one-person State Treasury companies, 
- shares’ sale continuation of 99 companies where the privatisation commenced before 
1994; the income gained amounted to 1294 bln PLZ in 1994. 
Table 2: Income from capital privatisation to the central budget in Poland  (R - 
total of the budget revenues).   
  Income from capital privatisation  Total income from privatisation 
Year  Bln PLZ      % GDP  % R                  % R 
1991  1247    0.15 0.59                    0.81 
1992  3129    0.27 1.00                    1.55 
1993  4385    0.28 0.95                     1.7 
1994  8468    0.40 1.34                     2.5 
Total  17229   0.28 0.97                     1.625   yearly average
Source: Prywatyzacja przedsiębiorstw państwowych GUS, 1992 - 1994, Raporty o 
przekształceniach własnościowych 1993, 1994 MPW. Own calculation. 
 
Chart 1: Income from capital privatisation and privatisation by liquidation to the State 













P rivatization by liquidation
 
 
Budgetary revenues from capital privatisation in the years between 1991 - 1994, 
amounted during a year approximately to 0.97 % (Table 2) of the total budget income. It 
should be stressed that the revenues obtained during the whole privatisation process show a 
growing tendency while the privatisation process covers more and more enterprises and the 
technique of the process improves (it is estimated that the income from the capital M. Antczak 
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privatisation itself shall increase if the privatisation of banks shall be continued, 
privatisation of telecommunication, oil industry and other monopolies commences). 
In the years between 1991 - 1992, the revenues from privatisation by liquidation 
(performed on the legal ground of two resolutions: concerning State enterprises and 
concerning the privatisation of State enterprises) aggregated to 0.3 % of the budget income 
and in 1993 increased up to 0.7 %, while the revenues from the capital privatisation 
amounted to the yearly average of 0.97 % of the total budget income. 
The income obtained from privatisation by liquidation (Table 3) consists of income 
from the sale of enterprises, lease payments and lease of State Treasury property. The 
income transferred by virtue of the above in the year 1991 and 1992 aggregated to 1628 bln 
PLZ, and in 1993 - 3288 bln PLZ, which constituted 42 % of the central budgetary revenues 
obtained from privatisation. The central budgetary revenues acquired from the sale or lease 
of the property belonging once to the liquidated State enterprises amounted to 3229 bln PLZ 
in 1994. The following were the elements that constituted budget income acquired from 
privatisation by liquidation in 1994: 
- charge for the use of State Treasury property - 1951 bln PLZ, sale of estate elements - 
1177 bln PLZ, 
- payment of means left after the liquidation of enterprises - 86 bln PLZ, 
- interest - 15 bln PLZ. 
The participation of revenues obtained from privatisation of enterprises by liquidation, 
on the legal ground of the resolution concerning State enterprises (Article 19 of the 
resolution concerning State enterprises issued on September 25, 1981 - bankruptcy of an 
enterprise), has risen slightly from 11.7 % revenues from privatisation by liquidation, in the 
years 1991 and 1992, to 12.5 % in 1993. By virtue of the resolution concerning State 
enterprises’ privatisation (Article 37 of the resolution concerning State enterprises’ 
privatisation issued on July 13, 1991 - liquidation in order to perform privatisation), in 1994 
the value of the  estate that has undergone privatisation amounted to 2255 bln PLZ (Table 
3). By virtue of Article 19 of the resolution concerning State enterprises’ privatisation, in 
1993 enterprises for the value of 412 bln PLZ have undergone privatisation, in 1994 this 
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Table 3: Revenues to the State budget from sale or lease of property belonging 
once to the liquidated State enterprises. (bln PLZ) 
    together  from sale  from lease 
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    Source: Prywatyzacja przedsiębiorstw państwowych GUS, 1992, 93, 94. 
 
In case of privatisation by liquidation in concordance with Art. 37 of the resolution 
concerning State enterprise’s privatisation, revenues obtained from the lease of property 
have a significant importance in the income to the budget, but income from sale is more 
important in constituting revenues from the privatisation of enterprises in concordance with 
Art. 19 of the resolution concerning State enterprises. The process of enterprise privatisation 
basing directly on the resolution concerning State enterprises’ privatisation proceeds quickly 
and effectively. This can be justified by the fact that liquidation has been finished in 85 % 
of the enterprises were this method of privatisation has been used. The percentage share of 
income from privatisation by liquidation has risen from 0.08 % GDP in the years 1991 - 
1992 to 0.21 % GDP in 1993 and 0.15 % GDP in 1994. 
The remaining part of the income from privatisation acquired by the State budget are 
revenues from the privatisation of banks. In 1993, they amounted to 539.6 bln PLZ, in 1994 
- 4252 bln PLZ. 
The total value of the income obtained from privatisation in the amount of 1594.9 bln 
PLZ in 1994, was equal to 2.5 % of the total budget income. A significant increase has been 
noticed in comparison with 1993, when the same relation aggregated to 1.7 %. In the years 
1992 - 1993, the average yearly income from privatisation in regard to the total budget 
income amounted to 1.625 % (Table 2). Nevertheless, the income acquired from 
privatisation is still not a very important factor influencing the condition of the State budget. 
This does not mean that little account is made over the revenues achieved; it rather points at 
the existing possibilities to increase them significantly in a near future, due to the increase 
of speed the privatisation is being performed with and the improvement of the efficiency of 
the privatisation processes. The potential income, linked with the continuation of the M. Antczak 
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privatisation of the banking sector, privatisation in such fields as tobacco industry, power 
engineering industry, telecommunication and with the tendency to enlarge the scope of 
privatisation, can be higher than that acquired up to the present moment. According to the 
data presented by the Ministry of Ownership Transformations
15 the increase of the direct 
income from privatisation will not have long-term characteristics. We can anticipate higher 
income during the next 2 - 3 years, and then the income will drop as a result of offers’ 
resource exhaustion - offering enterprises interesting from the point of view of privatisation.  
However, it can not be expected that the State budget income from the sale of 
enterprises or lease of property, shall reach such a level that it will have a crucial influence 
on the State budget condition. Generally, direct revenues from privatisation are not of great 
importance to the budget and they appeared to be smaller than anticipated. The fact that in 
Hungary in 1993, direct revenues exceeded the level of 7 % of the total budget income, 
justifies the singular character of revenues acquired from a single sale transaction of a huge 
telecommunication concern MATAV. 
 
Table 4. Direct income from the privatisation of State enterprises in Poland in the 
years 1991 - 1994 in bln PLZ. (R - total budget income). 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 
GDP  808800 1149442 1557800 2104073 
Total  income  210885 312775 459008 631252 
Income from privatisation  1709  4844  7804  15949 
    - % GDP  0.2  0.4  0.5  0.8 
    - % R  0.8  1.5  1.7  2.5 
Source: Fiscal Crisis Database and Rocznik statystyczny GUS 1995., own calculation 
 
It should be underlined that there are no legal regulations in the Polish Law obligating 
the budget to manage the income from privatisation in a precisely described manner. The 
pecuniary means obtained from privatisation are rather of incidental character in regard to 
other budgetary revenues, and they are used for current demands of the budget. Besides, in 
the present situation, there are no extraordinary needs to balance the budget
16, so urgent as 
they were at the beginning of economic transformations, in the aspect of deep macro-
economic unbalance. There are no extraordinary expenses (besides the foreign debt 
                                              
15 Raport o przeksztalceniach wlasnosciowych 1994r. 
16 In the future, there is a possibility of financing social security reform by virtue of revenues from 
privatisation of enterprises. Income from the Privatisation of State Enterprises... 
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servicing and financing the social security reform) that should be incurred and covered with 
the means originating from privatisation. It seems that there is a necessity to cumulate 
revenues due to the small scale of income from privatisation.  
  The privatisation execution requests incurring of particular expenses. The best part of 
these expenses is covered by the enterprises that frequently enables them to obtain certain 
advantages in the form of restructurisation activities commenced before the privatisation 
process starts. In Poland, the budget covers part of the expenses incurred due to 
restructurisation of an enterprise. In 1994, the privatisation costs amounted to 267857 bln 
PLZ, equal to 55.5 % of the planned value
17. A radical improvement of the relation between 
the expenses for privatisation and income from the privatisation has been noticed; from 8.5 
% in 1993 to 3.2 % in 1994. The decrease of expenses for privatisation has been connected 
with, among others, the consulting companies choosing method procedure improvement and 
the method of their remuneration. As a great number of consulting companies appeared on 
the market, it allows to choose one in the best possible manner, and in consequence, the best 
and relatively the cheapest. Generally, lowering the costs of privatisation is a visible sign of 
improving the organisation of the process. 
1.2.2. Hungary. 
A special government agency State Property Agency has been established in Hungary 
in order to manage the privatisation processes, execute transformations and sale State 
enterprises. After transforming a State enterprise into a company, SPA becomes its owner 
and commences the sale of the company’s stocks to the interested parties. Thus, SPA 
performs the role of the owner of State property, which has been located in companies 
assigned for privatisation and still remains State property. The Agency is also entitled to 
control all estate transactions executed by the company
18. This means that every estate sale 
transaction or its contribution to the company, is subject to the Agency’s control in 
concordance with the solidity of the estate evaluation performed and in concordance with 
the obligatory law regulations. Such transactions are valid in law after they have been 
approved by SPA. The employees of the prior State enterprise are entitled to purchase 20 % 
of the stocks  at preferential prices. The debtors of the enterprise can receive shares of the 
company as a gratification of claims. The State can remain the owner of the majority, or not, 
of the shares in enterprises where privatisation took place. 
When the Agency was established (1990) it played the role of the owner of the estate 
placed in 1848 State enterprises. Till April 1995, among them 695 (37.6 %) had undergone 
complete privatisation, 542 (29.3 %) were liquidated, and 611 still remain in the hands of 
SPA. The participation of State ownership in companies managed by SPA was 
                                              
17 Data included in this paragraph are quoted after ￿Raport o prywatyzacji za 1994r.￿. The estimated 
income from privatisation and the expenses incurred are included in the Resolution on Budget for 1994. 
18 On the legal ground of the resolution concerning the protection of State property, the Agency is 
obligated to supervise the activities of State companies, that have influence on the ownership status of 
companies managing property belonging to SPA. M. Antczak 
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systematically decreasing (80 % in 1990, 50 % in April 1995). In 1993, after the record year 
1992, the privatisation process slowed down and the revenues flowing to the budged 
dropped. Few reorganisations of SPA took place, together with an anti-privatisation 
propaganda, as the parliamentary elections came closer. The fact is, that 80 % of big 
enterprises that had undergone privatisation is now in the hands of foreign companies. 
  In 1992, the State still owned approximately half of the assets (of 129 bln USD value 
equals to  approx. 1 bln HUF). That is about 100 big and very big enterprises in a bad 
financial condition. They all are going to be restructured, and the ones of strategic 
importance the government decided to keep for a certain period of time, in concordance 
with the III Resolution issued in 1992
19, the rest is undergoing privatisation. The best way of 
privatisation in regard to such enormous industrial enterprises, where there is lack of 
interested Parties, is the common privatisation and that is why the Hungarian government 
decided at the end of 1992 to reconsider, rejected before, method of privatisation. 
 
Table 5: State Property Agency income from privatisation from 1990 till April 
1995 in bln HUF. 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994  IV.1995  Total 




0.53 24.61 40.98 25.50  6.10 1.41 99.13 
Sale for 
HUF 
0.14  4.82 17.51 15.30 14.10 2.88 54.75 
Cash 
income 
0.67 31.37 63.23 43.20 22.16 4.84  164.47 
Non-cash 
income 
-  1.01 11.59 38.60 75.11 8.41  134.72 
Total 
Income 
0.67 31.38 74.82 81.80 97.27 13.25  299.19 
Source: Facts about the Privatisation, Weekly Privinfo, Budapest, May 1995. 
  
  The cash income of the State Property Agency from 1990 till April 1995 amounted to 
164 bln HUF and it fed in whole the State budget. Generally, sale of property was executed 
in exchange currency (64 % of cash income
20). The non-cash income originated from the 
                                              
19 Resolution concerning management and use of the estate permanently owned by the State. 
20 After subtracting dividends. Income from the Privatisation of State Enterprises... 
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preferential method of privatisation (existence credit
21, leasing, re-privatisation bonds, 
shares for employees, etc.) and they were not an element of budget income. 
 Passing of the resolution concerning management of the production estate being 
permanently owned by the State (Law on the Management and Utilization of Permanent 
State Property, No. LIII of 1992 ) as the reason for the establishing of a State super-holding 
Hungarian State Holding Company, that is responsible for the management of big State 
enterprises. The belief that the State should play an active role in strategic departments of 
the economy (power engineering industry, transport, insurance, banking) was the basis for 
the establishment of the above Holding. The Holding was the owner of controlling interest 
in all the main commercial banks (in concordance with the Hungarian banking law the 
participation of the State in financial institutions cannot exceed 25 %). 
Table 6: Hungarian State Holding Company income from privatisation from 
1992 till April 1995 in bln of HUF. 
  1992 1993 1994  IV.1995  Total 




- 85.14  5.26  - 90.40 
Sale  for  HUF  - 0.62 2.43 0.01 3.06 
Cash income  3.51 89.99 10.19  0.04  103.73 
Non-cash 
income 
0.12 3.54  19.33 0.01  23.00 
Total  Income  3.63 93.53 29.52  0.05  126.73 
Source: Facts about the Privatisation, Weekly Privinfo, Budapest, May 1995. 
In 1992, the State Holding included in its shares holding 184 State enterprises (among 
them 160 big strategic enterprises). In May 1995, 158 enterprises from the above 184, were 
still managed by the Holding. In 1992, the State property equalled to approximately 92 % of 
the estate being managed by the Holding, and in April 1995 - approx. 74 %. 
  Between 1992 and April 1995, the total cash income of the State Holding aggregated 
to 103.7 bln HUF, and it fed the State budget. More than 80 bln HUF (70 % of the total cash 
income) originated from a single share sale transaction of the Hungarian telecommunication 
giant MATAV. 
 
                                              
21 Low-interest, long-term credit, offered by commercial banks in Hungary to investors purchasing  
State property. E-credit has been operating since 1991 and it is re-financed by the Central Bank of Hungary. M. Antczak 
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Table 7: Budget income from privatisation in Hungary in bln HUF. 
Year SPA  Holding  Total 
1990 0.67  -  0.67 
1991 30.37  -  30.37 
1992 63.23  3.51  66.74 
1993 43.20  89.99  133.19 
1994  22.16 10.19 32.35 
IV. 1995  4.84  0.039  4.88 
Total 164.47  103.73  268.2 
Source: Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Budapest 1993; State Property Agency, August 1993, 
Facts about Privatisation, Weekly Privinfo, Budapest, May 1995. Own calculation. 
 
Table 8: Direct income from privatisation in Hungary between 1991 - 1994. (R - 
total budget income). 
 1991  1992  1993  1994 
GDP (bln HUF)  2476.7  2885.6  3502.6 4314.1 
Total  income  1292.1 1619.8 1914.8 2254.3 
Income from 
privatisation 
30.37 66.74  133.19 32.35 
    - % GDP  1.22  2.3  3.8 0.74 
    - % R  2.35  4.12  6.9 1.43 
Sources: Fiscal Crisis Database and Luca Barbone MultiQuery Database: A Tool for 
Cross-Country Comparisons, March 1995, A. Ludanyi A Brief Overview of Hungarian 
Privatisation, Studies And Analyses 60 CASE, Warsaw, December 1995. 
 
Approximately 38 % of the total income originated from the preferential sale (SPA 
and Holding). Since 1993, these privatisation methods have been more frequently used, but 
in 1994 the cash income has significantly dropped, which had a negative effect on the State 
budget income in 1994. 
Due to the negative evaluation of the activity of two institutions dealing with 
privatisation  and State property control, these institutions have been consolidated. In May 
1995, State Property Privatisation and Management Agency have been established, in the 
place of SPA and Holding. Income from the Privatisation of State Enterprises... 
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In majority, the income from privatisation originated from capital privatisation, and it 
was in concordance with the financial priority of the Hungarian government. In yearly 
average, approximately  3.7 % of the total budget income of Hungary originated from the 
income from privatisation. The above was possible due to the enormous flow of foreign 
capital, especially from Germany (25 %), USA (24 %), Austria (14 %), France (7 %) and 
Great Britain (7 %), as well as due to offering the best enterprises acting in the market 
surroundings and frequently holding monopolistic positions (MATAV - tele-
communication). In effect, till the end of 1993, approx. 2.5 bln USD has flown to Hungary 
in the form of direct investments, international institutions’ credits and private companies. 
Till the end of 1994, the total value of foreign direct investments has amounted to 8 bln 
USD, including 3 bln USD regarded as a direct consequence of the privatisation process. 
Until April 1995, as a result of privatisation activities, the value of the foreign direct 
investments in Hungary aggregated to 427.5 bln HUF. 
During four years (1989 - 93) the participation of the private sector in creating the 
GDP has risen twice and it exceeded 50 % in 1993, and 61 % in 1994. Until the end of 
1994, the majority of tobacco, spirit, sugar, textile, building, meat processing, chemical, 
motor-cars and telecommunication industry plants have undergone privatisation. 
Summarising, the budget income from privatisation (mainly capital privatisation) 
amounted in Hungary in yearly average to 3.7 % of the total budget income, which 
constitutes over twice as much as at the same period of time in Poland
22. The Hungarian 
government more frequently than the Polish government granted tax exemptions to foreign 
investors, thus the tax revenues from enterprises were nominally lower in 1993 than in a 
previous year, but only for approx. 2.2 % (the inflation level in 1993 amounted to 22.5 %). 
Simultaneously, the subsidies for production granted to State enterprises dropped nominally 
by  over 26 %
23. Hungarian enterprises received financial support, technology and know-
how transfer. The small capacity of the Hungarian market and the economic recession in 
Western Europe does not allow for the full usage of these factors, but time works in favour 
of Hungary. 
1.2.3. The Czech Republic. 
The Czech privatisation programme contemplated the execution of privatisation using 
methods that do not predict large revenues to the State budget, due to the balanced macro-
economic situation. In the Czech Republic, contrary to Poland and Hungary, there was no 
urgent need to balance the budget. The decision was made to execute privatisation on State 
property as quickly as possible, leaving the restructurisation of enterprises to future owners 
and underlining the decrease of social expenses for the process, as well as other social 
aspects of common enfranchisement such as increase of awareness in regard to ownership 
                                              
22 In Hungary, income from capital privatisation constituted over 80 % of the whole income from 
privatisation, and in Poland 65 %. Such results are the effect of a wide range of privatisation methods in 
Poland, and in Hungary - the flow of foreign capital.  
23 Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, 11/1993, Budapest. M. Antczak 
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and the possibility to freely manage owned property. Besides, mass privatisation was 
cheaper from standard methods by the enterprises’ evaluation expenses. 
  The mass privatisation has been executed with the help of companies and investment 
funds, where individual investors could invest their vouchers. Every citizen received 1000 
investment points (for a low payment), with which he could purchase  (individually or 
through investment funds) stocks of these enterprises that were assigned for voucher 
privatisation. In average, 30 % of the enterprises undergoing voucher privatisation stocks 
have been predominated for mass privatisation. However, there were companies which 
stocks in the whole (precisely 97 %, because 3 % of the value of each enterprise has been 
assigned for the reprivatisation fund) have been exchanged to vouchers, and they become 
the property of individual investors or investment funds, that through the activity on the 
capital market shaped their market value rate. The income from privatisation of big State 
enterprises did not affect the budget; it constituted the income for the National Property 
Fund, State organisation established in order to execute the privatisation of enterprises and 
the control of private companies. The Fund is the owner of 20 % of the book value of 
enterprises undergoing privatisation. In the Czech Republic, the control of State over the 
privatisation process is also visible in the fact that the government remains the owner, in 
average,  of 40 % of shares in each, big commercial bank. 
  The newly created private sector is distinguished for the specific position in respect 
of the big, commercial banks. In the mass privatisation process, big banks, through their 
privatisation funds, become the most important owners of the private property. Thus, the 
future of the private sector in the Czech Republic depends on the banks, banking system 
reform and the capital market development. Besides, the Czech enterprises are regarded as 
private ones, even when the government is in possession of 20 % of the shares, 40 % is held 
by the bank owned in-half by the State, and the remaining 20 % is held by small private 
investors. Clearly the State’s control in each company undergoing privatisation has been 
extensively limited, but not on the whole. 
 The privatisation scope in Czechoslovakia covered all the sectors of economy, 
excluding nuclear power plants, mining industry and railway, considered by the government 
as strategic. The  privatisation has been executed also in some public utility plants and 
monopolies, such as telecommunication, water supply systems and power plants. A radical 
privatisation plan of Czech enterprises assigned all industrial plants and almost all State 
enterprises. 
 Generally, the large privatisation (excluding mass privatisation) dealt with light 
industry enterprises of average size, and it was executed with most efficiency in comparison 
with the rest of the Wyshegrad Group countries, mainly due to the lack of opposition on the 
side of the employees. 
  The privatisation of big enterprises was executed on the legal ground of the following 
legal acts: 
- Law No. 104/1990  "Concerning joint-stock companies", 
- Law No. 111/1990 "Concerning State enterprises", Income from the Privatisation of State Enterprises... 
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- Law No. 92/1991 "Concerning the transfer of the State property to other entities", 
- Law No. 171/1991 "Concerning the size of the State’s control over the property 
transferred to other entities". 
In concordance with the Law (No.92/1991) the privatisation of big enterprises in the 
Czech Republic was executed in accordance to the following methods: 
1. Sale of an enterprise or its part through" 
- direct sale of its assets to local or foreign investors, 
- public offer, 
- auction (according to the same conditions as the small privatisation). 
2. Transformation of an enterprise into a joint-stock company with the following 
possibilities of allocating stocks: 
a) distribution through vouchers, 
b) sale by financial institutions, 
c) sale to the employees, 
d) sale to local and foreign investors, 
e) transfer to municipal institutions, retirement funds, local authorities, social security 
institutions and banks (so-called free transfer), 
g) number of shares can permanently or periodically be placed in the National Property 
Fund, 
h) besides, at least 3 % of the shares of each enterprise is reserved for the restitution of 
property, and more than 3 % is reserved if there is a real possibility that part of the 
estate will have to undergo reprivatisation. 
In order for the Ministry of Privatisation to approve the ownership transfer of the 
enterprise, a privatisation project has to be submitted, which may include a combination of 
the mentioned above methods of large privatisation, as well as mass privatisation, the so-
called voucher privatisation, (in average 30 %). A number of stocks of the enterprise 
undergoing privatisation may be reserved for vouchers
24 , a part (of stocks or estate) may be 
sold in the direct sale (to local or foreign investors), and part may be freely transferred to 
constitute municipal property. It is important, that the sale of coupons is only one of the 
methods used in the Czech process of large privatisation. 
                                              
24 Thus, such an enormous union of large privatisation with voucher privatisation. M. Antczak 
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 The privatisation plan of January, 1991, assumed two stages of the privatisation 
process. The first stage commenced in June, 1991, when the preliminary list of enterprises 
assigned for privatisation in the first place was presented. In September, 1991, the 
evaluation of the first stage  enterprises took place. It was planned that 3 thousand
25 Czech 
State enterprises shall undergo privatisation (among 5 thousand that existed), 2/3 of that 
number have been assigned for the large privatisation, and the rest for the mass 
privatisation. The first stage was concluded in October, 1991, by submitting all the 
privatisation projects to the Ministry of Privatisation and to the branch Ministries. It dealt 
with the sale of 1777 units ( among 3.5 thousand existing ones) in the Czech Republic and 
623 units (among 1900) in Slovakia. The second stage of the large privatisation commenced 
in June, 1992 and it dealt with 861 enterprises. 
  The main problem of the large privatisation in the Czech Republic were the delays in 
the realisation of privatisation transactions. Frequently, it took a year between the 
establishment of the contract and fulfilling its conditions (payment). Such delays (often 
caused by the imperfection of the legal system) introduced confusion in statistical data. 
  The transformation of enterprises into joint-stock companies had the biggest share in 
the ownership transfer of the State property, in concordance with the large privatisation. At 
the end of 1994, this method was used in 83.5 %, and it slightly dropped in 1992 in favour 
of the growth of importance of direct sales, which was visible in the increase of flow of 
revenues from privatisation to the National Property Fund. 
  During the first stage of privatisation, the Ministry approved transformation forms for 
over 2200 enterprises, which total value of estate amounted to 468.9 bln CZK
26. At the end 
of 1993, the estate assigned for privatisation was evaluated for 871.6 bln CZK, in actual 
prices. This value represents approximately 70 % of the estate previously belonging to State 
enterprises. Until the end of 1994, Ministry of Privatisation approved the privatisation forms 
for about 94 % of the enterprises’ estate, for those enterprises for which privatisation 
projects were submitted in the first and second stage of the large privatisation. The value of 
the whole approved estate amounted to 896 bln CZK, which represents 80 - 90 % of the 





                                              
25 Data included in this paragraph concerning the number of enterprises that have undergone 
privatisation has been taken from the ￿Privatisation in Czechoslovakia: Constraints and Preliminary Impacts￿ 
Oliver Bouin, CEFRES, Prague, August 1992. 
26 Exchange rate in 1993 was 29 CZK, and in 1994 28.5 CZK. Income from the Privatisation of State Enterprises... 
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Table 9. Large privatisation methods in the Czech Republic (data aggregated 
for each year). 
  Property approved for privatisation in bln CZK  share in % 
  1992 1993 1994   
Sale of an enterprise  40.5 71.3  107.5  10.5 
including direct sale  26.5  46.3  61.4  6.8 
Transformation into a 
joint-stock company 
418.7 754.3 748.2  82.5 
including vouchers from 
the first phase 
 258.8 212.0  23.6 
including vouchers from 
the second phase 
   155.0  17.3 
Free transfer  9.6 30.0 38.0  4.2 
Restitution   16.0 15.8  1.8 
TOTAL  468.8 871.5 896.0  100 
Source: Ministry of Privatisation of the Czech Republic, own calculation. 
Table 10. National Property Fund income from large privatisation. 
  NPF real income 
1992  26.5 bln CZK 
1993  24.4 bln CZK 
1994  34.2 bln CZK 
Total  85.1 bln CZK 
Source: Alena Buchtikova, "Privatisation in the Czech Republic", Studies and Analyses 
53, CASE, Warsaw, 1995. 
 
Such far advanced privatisation process in the Czech Republic does not mean that the 
ownership rights had been transferred in full  to the private sector. The National Property 
Fund, responsible for the realisation of approved by the Ministry of Privatisation projects, 
till the end of 1994 executed privatisation in 2/3 of the estates assigned for privatisation. 1/3 
had undergone privatisation during the first and second phase of voucher privatisation, 1/3 
using standard methods (including simple shares transfer, free transfer and restitution), and 
the remaining 1/3 of the estate assigned for privatisation still remains in the hands of the 
National Property Fund. It means that, including the property of the companies that were 
not assigned for privatisation, 40 % of the estate of prior State enterprises still remains in 
the hands of the State. M. Antczak 
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 Due to its specific character (distribution of investment points for the purchase of 
shares of enterprises undergoing privatisation) mass privatisation, although covered 30 % of 
the property assigned for privatisation, did not generate any income for the National 
Property Fund. Privatisation funds, operating on the capital market, regulated the market 
price of the vouchers, but it should be remembered that they were originally sold for free-of-
charge investment points. The NPF income originates from standard privatisation methods 
of big enterprises, specifically from the direct sale to local or foreign investors. The 
participation of foreign investors played a significant part in the privatisation program 
realisation. Since 1990 till 1994, 3 bln USD fled into the Czech Republic in the form of 
foreign direct investments. 
 
Table 11: Direct income from the State enterprises privatisation in the Czech 
Republic between 1991 - 1994 in bln CZK. (R - total budget income). 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 
GDP 716.6  803.3  923.1  1060.0 
Total income    381.1  459.9  517.28 
Income from privatisation    26.5  24.4  34.2 
%  GDP   3.29 2.64 3.22 
% R     6.95  5.3  6.61 
  Source: Fiscal Crisis Database and Luca Barbone MultiQuery Database: A Tool for 
Cross-Country Comparisons, March 1995, M.Antczak "Zarys proces￿w 
prywatyzacyjnych w Republice Czech", CASE, Warsaw, November 1995. 
 
 Part of the revenues (approx. 20 %) is permanently kept by the Fund on special 
accounts in the main Czech banks. The rest of the income is assigned for infrastructure 
investments, environment protection and for lowering social costs of system transformation. 
   It is worth noticing, that the income from privatisation reached such big values in the 
Czech Republic. What is more, initially it has not been anticipated as the main target; non-
equivalent method was more in favour. The income obtained from the enterprise sale in 
comparison with the created GDP and total value of budget income was the highest from all 
the countries of the Wyshegrad Group. The average yearly income acquired from the large 
privatisation flowing to the National Property Fund, amounted up to 6.28 % of the total 
budget income, that is 4 times more than in Poland and almost twice as much as in Hungary. 
Only in 1993, in Hungary, the percentage share of revenues from privatisation in the created 
GDP exceeded the values in the Czech Republic and aggregated to 3.8 %, whereas the share 
of the income from privatisation in the created GDP in Poland never exceeded 1 %, and in 
1994 was equal to 0.8 %. In the Czech Republic, this indicator circulated around 3 %. Income from the Privatisation of State Enterprises... 
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  The experience derived from the Czech privatisation shows that the execution of the 
enterprises mass privatisation encourages investors to invest more actively in the Czech 
Republic than in their country, where the mass privatisation, as a method not contributing 
any income to the State budget, has been initially rejected. This is probably derived from 
three main facts: 
1. Potential investors instead of allowing for the number of shares of the enterprise to be 
assigned for vouchers or transferred to the State Treasury, (which is rather common in 
the Czech Republic), prefer to chose "the lesser of two evils" and they invest 
themselves, thus generating higher profit for the NPF. The mass privatisation, which 
creates anonymous and dispersed ownership structure of the enterprises undergoing 
privatisation, induce investors to increase their participation particularly in those 
companies where the element of vouchers in respect to the total number of shares is 
small. Investors who hold the majority of shares can decide about the future of the 
company, methods of its management and they can participate in the profit in a wider 
extent than those investors who hold smaller packets of shares. 
2. Privatisation projects are prepared very carefully in order to execute the mass 
privatisation, and they are a good source of information for the investors. Each project 
includes a value stating in what extent shares or stock of the enterprise are going to be 
assigned for vouchers. The Ministry of Privatisation approves projects and the sale is 
performed by the National Property Fund, which is interested in increasing its income 
from privatisation. Common privatisation does not ensure revenues, so NPF is inclined 
to sell the shares of the enterprises using standard methods in a wider extent than it 
was described in the project. It generates higher income than it was previously 
predicted. 
3. Common access to the privatisation projects of enterprises assigned for common 
privatisation, evokes interest of a bigger number of investors thus influencing the 
market value of the enterprise in the opinion of potential investors. As a result, a 
bigger number of shares is sold to private investors or such shares are sold at a higher 
price, which influences the NPF income increase. 
 
1.3. Justification for Hypothesis 1. 
 One of the basic explanations of the hypothesis stating that the income from 
privatisation has little significance in balancing the macro-economic situation, results from 
the differences in the evaluation of the property assigned for privatisation. There are at least 
three methods of evaluation. The first one is the book value originating from the end of the 
eighties. In the conditions of macro-economic unbalance and with the high level of inflation 
(especially in Poland and in Hungary), the book value had to be re-evaluated. The first 
chance to recount the book value of the property assigned for privatisation was 
commercialisation.  The process of transforming an enterprise into one-person State 
Treasury company covered all enterprises denominated for privatisation in Hungary and the 
Czech Republic, whereas in Poland only those enterprises were commercialised which were M. Antczak 
CASE Foundation  26
to undergo capital privatisation or common privatisation or were to be restructured. Thus, 
re-evaluation of the value of an enterprise’s property in Poland (performed few times on the 
legal ground of the resolution issued by the Council of Ministers) was performed only in 
respect to a number of enterprises. Until the end of 1994, 844 enterprises (approx. 18 %)
27 
included in the ownership transformation programme have been transformed into one-
person State Treasury companies. The market value of an enterprise has been established at 
the time when at least a sale of the part of an enterprise has been concluded. Thus, the sale 
of the rest of the property took place at the price originally set. The estate evaluation 
methods are often mixed in the privatisation statistics without stating precisely at what stage 
of transformation (of the economy and of the enterprise) the evaluation has been performed. 
 The experience collected in Hungary shows that the differences between the book 
value and the market value changed periodically: until 1992 - the sale price of the 
companies exceeded the book value even by 20 - 30 %, and from 1992 - the market value of 
the companies undergoing privatisation began to drop in respect to the book value, or even 
it was lower. There are two possible explanations to the phenomenon: 
1. At the beginning of the privatisation process, enterprises with better macro-economic 
results were more sought after by investors28, with the still existing capital resources 
(not used up yet). Together with the growing recession, investors lost gradually their 
interest. 
2. The value of the State property gradually undergoes depreciation for economical and 
"outside" economy reasons. 
  The phenomenon described above causes the decrease, due to the diminution of the 
market value of the property assigned for privatisation,  of the potential income obtained 
from the sale of the property. The percentage income from privatisation participation 
increase in the State budget  and in the creation of the GDP is the result of the steady 
development of the privatisation process, showing in the yearly increase of the number of 
companies included in the ownership transformation processes. 
  Thus, taking into consideration views presented above, direct income obtained from 
the privatisation of State enterprises cannot rise dramatically in a short period of time, and it 
cannot have a "short-term" impact on the budget condition, as it cannot significantly 
influence the decrease of the budget deficit. 
 
 
                                              
27 Data included in the ￿Prywatyzacja przedsiębiorstw państwowych￿ as on 31.12.1994., GUS, 
Warsaw 1995. 
28 Similar phenomenon has been noticed in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, where for the first  stage 
of the voucher privatisation such enterprises were assigned which it was predicted would not cause any 
problems while executing their privatisation. Income from the Privatisation of State Enterprises... 
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2: HYPOTHESIS 2: 
 
In Poland, the indirect income from privatisation, in a longer period of time 
compensates for the lost revenues flowing to the State budget due to dividends from the 
State enterprises initial fund. The improvement of the financial results of the private sector 
enterprises and the growth of that sector, contribute to the farther increase of the budget 
income. 
The impact of the privatisation on the condition of the budget is not limited only to the 
income from sale, lease or leasing of the estate’s elements being in possession by the State 
Treasury, nor to the expenses connected with the above, which are reflected in the budget. 
The second, crucial factor is the change in relations between the different types of taxes 
flowing to the budget from the public and private sector enterprises. They include: income 
tax, dividends, remuneration increase tax
29 and indirect taxes, paid by the private sector 
enterprises. The dividends from the enterprise’s initial fund encumber only State enterprises, 
that is why the loss of revenues, in respect to the above, is frequently accounted for the 
privatisation costs. Not denying the decrease of real
30 income from the dividends, it is 
necessary to point out that the basic reason for the introduction of dividends
31 was the 
                                              
29 From April 1 1994, the remuneration increase tax has been suppressed, and until July 1994 there 
was no obligatory form of control, of system character, of shaping the wages. In the second half of the year, 
the method of shaping wages by negotiations has been introduced. The income originating from the sanction 
fee for passing the limit of remuneration increase amounted to 879 bln PLZ. 
30 Real expression of all economic values analysed in this study  reflects the prices as in 1991. 
31 In 1989, a dividend in the amount of 44 % of the initial fund value has been introduced. That kind of 
fiscal encumbrance (similar to the income tax paid by enterprises) was very characteristic for the specific 
Polish situation due to the huge public sector. The dividend was a kind of warning and cover for State 
enterprises. It encumbered especially new enterprises, which had higher initial funds contrary to long-
existing enterprises. The dividend enforced maximisation of production efficiency on an enterprise. In 1989 
and 1990, with hyperinflation, the real value of the initial fund not re-evaluated dropped, which was the 
reason for the reduction of revenues from dividends flowing to the central budget. Additionally, the reason 
for the decrease of revenues from dividends in 1990, was the decrease of the dividend’s rate to 40 % in that 
year. In 1991, re-evaluation of enterprises’ estate took place (including initial fund), thus the dividend rate 
has been reduced to 22 %, and it was obligatory until June 1992. The inflation in 1991 dropped to about 60 
% for a year, which even with the decrease of the dividend rate, caused considerable increase of revenues 
from dividends flowing to the central budget. In June 1992, the dividend rate has been reduced again to 10 
%. In 1993, the interest rate has not been changed. 
 M. Antczak 
CASE Foundation  28
regulatory function, not the fiscal one. The dividend was to stimulate the increase of 
efficiency in taking advantage of the State enterprises’ estate
32. 
While evaluating the extent of indirect revenues flowing to the State budget from the 
public and private sector,  one has to remember about the character and structure of both 
sectors. The State still owned difficult to perform privatisation on, and capital intense 
branches of the economy, such as: mining industry, power industry, municipal enterprises, 
heavy industry, pharmaceutical industry, copper industry or heavy chemical industry. Some 
of the branches of the public sector are very profitable, that is why they constitute a very 
powerful tax potential. In Poland, which at the threshold of structural reforms had big 
resources of cheap work force, development of capital intense branches of economy had 
been observed. The newly arising private sector quickly developed trade, services, catering 
business and small production. Private agriculture is also included in the private sector, as it 
is exempted from income tax, thus it does not contribute to the budget income increase. 
Profitability of the private sector enterprises is still lower on the average than in the public 
sector, but private enterprises demonstrate improvement of financial effects. This, together 
with the development of the private sector influences strengthening of the tax potential. It 
gives a chance for the increase of budget income and for the compensation of the lost 
revenues from dividends. 
 
2.1. Indirect income from privatisation originating from direct 
tax revenues in Poland. 
Since 1992, the revenues to the budget from State enterprises initial fund dividends 
have been decreasing quicker than the direct income from privatisation has been growing. It 
means that the predicted drop in revenues from the executed privatisation, caused short-term 
diminution of budget income (taking into consideration only income from privatisation). In 
1994, revenues from the payments from dividends (Table 12) dropped to 1 % of the total 
income (from the level of 7.6 % in 1991), whereas direct income from the privatisation 
increased in 1994 up to 2.5 % of the total budgetary revenues, but it has not compensated 
the loss of revenues from dividends. Taking into consideration the fact that privatisation is a 
long-term process, the decrease in revenues from dividends appeared gradually, and the loss 
of revenues is also insignificant. Simultaneously, it can be excepted that the privatisation of 
enterprises shall lead to the increase of profits of those enterprises, as well as, of tax 
revenues flowing to the State budget. 
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Table 12: Revenues to the State budget from sale, lease or leasing of the State 
property (direct income from privatisation) and dividends from the initial fund 
of enterprises in Poland between 1991 - 1994 in bln PLZ. (R - total of budgetary 
revenues.) 
 Direct  income 
from privatisation 
% R   dividend  % R 
1991  1709 0.8  16123 7.6 
1992  4844 1.5  12728 4.1 
1993  7804 1.7  7104 1.5 
1994  15949 2.5  6279 1.0 
 Source: Wyniki finansowe podmiot￿w gospodarczych za IV kwartał 1991, 92, 93, 94r., 
Bilansowe wyniki finansowe podmiot￿w gospodarczych za 1991, 92, 93, 94r., GUS, 
Warsaw. Own calculation. 















Direct income from privatization
 
In the period of time between 1991 - 1994 a real (in comparison to 1991) decrease of 
income flowing to the State budget from the corporate income tax from enterprises in the 
Polish economy
33 has been noticed. This is the result, among others, of the general change 
in the structure of State budget income, observed at that time. The tax revenues dropped 
with the increase of non-tax payments. In 1991, the payments due to corporate income tax 
amounted to 20.4 % of the total budgetary revenues
34, in 1992  dropped to 13 %, in 1993 to 
11.4 %, and in 1994 to 9 % of the income in total. In 1994, public sector, from which 
revenues dropped by 51 %, had a significant influence on the decrease by 43 %, in 
comparison with 1991, of real revenues from corporate income tax. The State budget 
income from the income tax paid by the private sector increased in all sectors of economy 
over six times. The highest increase, 15 times, of real revenues paid by the private sector 
                                              
33 Budgetary revenues from the income tax paid by legal and natural persons dropped. 
34 In 1991, income of the State budget from the dividend and remuneration increase tax were almost 
equal to the income obtained from the income tax. M. Antczak 
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has been noticed in transport (Table 13), industry (10 times) and trade (3 times). The 
revenues from that tax contributed by the public sector seemed quite differently. The highest 
decrease, in respect to 1991, of revenues paid by the public sector has been observed in 
building industry by 92 %, industry by 46 % and trade by 38 %. An increase by 3 % of 
revenues from the income tax contributed by public sector enterprises has been visible in 
Transport. 
Table 13: Real (expressed in prices as in 1991) revenues from income tax 
contributed by private sector enterprises in main branches of the economy. (bln 
PLZ.) 
 Total  Industry  Building 
industry 
Transport Trade 
1991  1087 262 496  17 187 
1992  1751  1261 915 140  1194 
1993  4982  1857 920 228  1510 
1994  6124  2852 878 286 836 
Source: Wyniki finansowe podmiot￿w gospodarczych za IV kwartał 1991, 92, 93, 94r., 
Bilansowe wyniki finansowe podmiot￿w gospodarczych za 1991, 92, 93, 94r., GUS, 
Warsaw. Own calculation. 
The diagram clearly illustrates the increase of real income of the State budget from the 
income tax contributed by the private sector enterprises. 
Chart 3: Real budgetary revenues income tax paid by private sector 


















Income tax is a tax on the acquired profit (gross profit), which is obligatory for the 
economy subject to be contributed to the State budget, after taking into consideration all the 
exemptions granted. In regard to the tax exemptions granted to the newly established Income from the Privatisation of State Enterprises... 
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companies, it should be underlined that the level of the exemption cannot be identified with 
the lost tax revenues. Probably, without the possibility to obtain tax exemptions, many of 
the existing and contributing taxes companies, would not even come to existence, thus the 
income generated by them could be treated as lost. 
The corporate income tax paid by the enterprises included in the ownership 
transformation process since 1991, constituted a significant part of tax revenues paid by 
private sector enterprises and all enterprises in the Polish economy. The participation of the 
corporate income tax, paid by private sector enterprises systematically increases (also in real 
values), which is not only a result of the number increase of companies undergoing 
privatisation, but also a result of their financial condition improvement. The data included in 
Table 14 justifies the above. In 1991, the participation of the private sector in the creation of 
the GDP amounted to 42.1 % and this sector contributed to the budget (from the income tax 
from legal persons) revenues equal to 0.1 % of the GDP. In 1992, real tax revenues from the 
private sector enterprises doubled. The participation of the private sector in the creation of 
GDP increased up to 47.9 % in 1993, that is in respect to 1991, by 5.8 percentage point, 
while at the same period of time the participation of corporate income tax revenues
35 of the 
private sector in GDP increased over 6 times. 
Table 14: Nominal budgetary revenues from personal and corporate income tax from all 
public and private sector enterprises in particular branches of economy. The participation 
of the public and private sector in the creation of the GDP. R - total budget income. 
  Income tax  % R  % GDP   
Total      
1991 43023  20.4  5.3  
1992 40717  13.0  3.5  
1993 52651  11.4  3.4  
1994  56765 9.0 2.7  
Public sector       
1991 37929  18.0  4.7  
1992 35293  11.3  3.0  
1993  43649 9.5 2.8  
1994  42570 6.7 2.0  
Private sector      Participation of the private 
sector in the creation of GDP 
1991  1087 0.5 0.1 42.1  % 
1992  2425 0.8 0.2 45.2  % 
1993  9002 2.0 0.6 47.9  % 
1994  14195 2.2 0.7 46.4  % 
Source: Wyniki finansowe podmiot￿w gospodarczych za IV kwartał 1991, 92, 93, 94 r., 
Bilansowe wyniki finansowe podmiot￿w gospodarczych za 1991, 92, 93, 94r., GUS, 
Roczniki Statystyczne GUS 1991 - 1995, Warsaw. Own calculation. 
In 1994, the participation of tax revenues from the private sector was still growing up 
to 0.7 % of the GDP, while the decrease in participation of the private sector in the creation 
of GDP has been noticed. Such a high growth of real tax revenues (Table 13) shows the 
                                              
35 Additionally, the participation of budgetary revenues from the income tax from natural persons 
increased. This concerns also revenues from private enterprises managed by natural persons. M. Antczak 
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efficiency improvement of private sector enterprises, as well as, strengthening of the tax 
apparatus. 
Chart 4: Relation between the share of revenues from income tax in respect to the GDP, 
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The personal income tax from persons employed in companies being privatised, 
should be accounted as indirect income from privatisation of enterprises. Due to the 
improvement of the financial condition of privatised companies, increase of budgetary 
revenues from income tax paid by these companies and an increase of tax revenues paid by 
employees, should be anticipated, especially as the number of people employed in the 
private sector is growing and it is falling in the public sector (Table 15). The above and 
improving micro-economic effects of the private sector, through the wage increase, may 
generate increased revenues from personal income tax from persons employed in private 
companies. 
Table 15: Working force in the public and private sector, in big- and medium-
size enterprises, that is employing more than 5 people. 
  1992 1993 1994  IX.1995 
Total    5839003 5497872 5328219 4617288 
Public  sector  3981070 3411420 3212716 2846552 
Private  sector  1857926 2026730 2115503 1770736 
Source: Wyniki finansowe podmiot￿w gospodarczych za IV kwartał 1991, 92, 93, 94r., 
Bilansowe wyniki finansowe podmiot￿w gospodarczych za 1991, 92, 93, 94r., GUS, 
Warsaw. Own calculation. 
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Revenues from the personal income tax from natural persons employed in the private 
sector, not included in the analysis, should be added to the tax revenues contributed by that 
sector. Many private individual enterprises, the so-called family businesses, which are not 
subject to corporate income tax. Personal income tax from persons of the private sector, 
however are not possible to identify in the statistics including joint data for both sectors. 
However, it should be remembered, that personal income tax from persons employed in the 
private sector, although not included in this analysis, constitute a significant source of 
revenues of the State budget. Simultaneously, with the private sector development and the 
rationalisation of the tax apparatus, those revenues will bear more and more significance. 
 
Table 16: Percentage share of the corprate and personal income tax in the 
creation of GDP in the years 1990 - 1994. 
Years  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Corporate income tax   26.8  5.8  3.3  4.2  3.2 
Personal income tax   1.1  0.3  5.4  9.1  8.2 
Source: Roczniki statystyczne GUS, 1991 - 1995, Warsaw. Own calculation. 
 
The phenomenon of the "grey zone", where taxes are not paid or they are lowered, is 
regarded as the budget cost of privatisation. Most frequently, it is true in respect to the 
private sector. In the initial stage of the privatisation the economy subjects multiplication 
process has been observed. Those subjects were a difficult object of taxation due to their M. Antczak 
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lack of activity control. Newly established or privatised companies increased their costs’ 
level of obtaining income, thus lowering the basis for taxation. This is clearly visible in the 
costs’ level indicator
36, which in all departments of economy
37 (excluding building industry) 
is higher in the private sector than in the public sector, and it does not decrease with the 
improvement of the financial condition (Table 17). The avoidance of paying taxes in many 
cases is also the result of tax regulations, which encourage to take advantage of the income 
acquiring costs category. The costs’ level indicator of building industry enterprises in the 
private sector grew by almost 3 percentage points in 1992. 
 
Table 17. Cost level indicator change of all enterprises, public and private 
sector enterprises from the end of 1992 till September 1995, in chosen 
departments of economy. 
 Total  Industry  Building 
industry 
Transport Trade 
Total       
         1992  96.2  96.7  95.2  98.3  98.3 
    IX.1995  95.3  95.6  97.2  92.6  97.5 
Public  sector       
         1992  96.0  96.5  96.4  98.4  97.3 
    IX.1995  94.4  95.3  99.8  91.9  96.4 
Private  sector       
         1992  99.0  98  93.9  97.7  99.4 
    IX.1995  96.4  97.5  96.3  95.9  98  
Source: Wyniki finansowe podmiot￿w gospodarczych za IV kwartał 1991, 92, 93, 94r., 
Bilansowe wyniki finansowe podmiot￿w gospodarczych za 1991, 92, 93, 94r., GUS, 
Warsaw. 
 
One of the reasons why some enterprises lower the taxes to be paid, is probably the 
fact that the tax apparatus does not operate very effectively as the number of privatised 
                                              
36 Costs’ level indicator is the relation between  acquiring income from the business activity on the 
whole and income from the business activity on the whole expressed in percentage. 
37 Since 1994 EKD classification is obligatory, according to which section ￿industry￿ has been divided 
into the following parts: mining, production and electric power and gas supply. As the same groups were 
included in the ￿industry￿ in the previously obligatory classification, these groups are treated also as 
￿industry￿ in this study. Income from the Privatisation of State Enterprises... 
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companies is rapidly growing. "Strengthening" the tax apparatus and a more effective 
manner of collecting taxes that feed the State budget should be the reaction to the above. It 
should be pointed out that the rapid development of the new private companies’ sector, even 
in cases when payment of taxes is avoided either by these companies or their employees, 
carries positive effects for the economy, thus for the budget. They generate new work 
places, supply new goods and services, generate budgetary revenues, among others, through 
indirect taxes included in the price of goods and services. It has been noticed lately, that the 
process of small companies’ activities concentration shall have an impact on the 
improvement of the tax discipline, which in turn shall contribute to the tax revenues 
increase for the State budget. On the other hand, there is an on-going process of learning 
how not to pay taxes by State companies, which is clearly visible in the previous USSR 
states. 
The State enterprises’ privatisation influences budget balancing, not only from the 
income side, but it also limits expenses. One of the main targets of executing privatisation 
of State enterprises is the aim to balance the State’s budget, not only in respect to the direct 
and indirect income (increase of tax income from enterprises, their employees and indirect 
taxes), but also in respect of the privatisation process influence on the government’s 
expenses increase limitation (by eliminating subventions for State enterprises). If we accept 
the fact that the State enterprises’ privatisation leads to the improvement of their 
performance, then the newly created private sector creates new work-places in a far bigger 
extent than the public sector. Thus, the private sector creates more possibilities for the work 
place market development in comparison with the public sector
38. This influences limitation 
of unemployment in the national economy, which allows to decrease expenses for social 
benefits, for example unemployment allowance. 
Data included in Table 18 illustrates the improvement of privatised enterprises 
financial condition. The gross profit
39 in real expression (profit or loss) of all enterprises has 
been systematically improving after a drop of real value by 2.5 times, which was observed 
in 1992 in comparison with 1991. At the introduction of system changes, the worsening 
financial results of enterprises reflected the then existing state of macro-economic 
unbalance; the profitability of enterprises dropped rapidly, especially in the public sector. 
The economic stabilisation programme that has been introduced, system reforms, including 
privatisation, contributed to the improvement of big enterprises’ condition and to the 
increase of their profits. The real gross profit in 1994, grew almost twice in comparison to 
1992, gaining the similar level as in 1991. Satisfactory financial results of enterprises in the 
private and public sector contributed to that growth. 
 
                                              
38 In a short period of time privatisation leads to the drop in a number of work places, although the 
new private sector development creates a chance for the decrease of unemployment, as well as it creates 
possibilities for illegal employment. 
39 The gross profit is the enterprises’ business activity result, corrected by the profit balance and 
extraordinary losses. M. Antczak 
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Table 18: Gross profit in bln PLZ and the return of equity of enterprises in the 
private and public sector between 1991 - 1994. 
  Gross profit in bln PLZ  Capital Rerutn Rate 
Total    
1991 67439   
1992 40070  0.04 
1993 60616  0.07 
1994 132275  0.15 
Public sector     
1992 38561  0.05 
1993 41222  0.07 
1994 89183  0.17 
Private sector     
1992 6509  0.02 
1993 19394  0.06 
1994 43092  0.11 
The return of equity is the relation between enterprise’s profit and its own funds, and it 
expresses the ability of the given sector to the development. 
Source: Wyniki finansowe podmiot￿w gospodarczych za IV kwartał 1991, 92, 93, 94r., 
Bilansowe wyniki finansowe podmiot￿w gospodarczych za 1991, 92, 93, 94r., GUS, 
Warsaw, Own calculation. 
 
Analysing the values included in Table 18, we can easily notice that the gross profit of 
private sector enterprises has increased in 1994 for about 4 time in comparison to 1992, 
while in the public sector the improvement of the result is insignificant and it was nearly 40 
%. The biggest improvement of the gross profit in comparison to 1992 has been noticed in 
the industry. In private sector enterprises by 4.6 times, in public sector enterprises by 4 
times. In the building industry the gross profit decreased in the public sector (in 1994 - gross 
real loss amounting to -568 bln PLZ), as well as in the private sector, where the gross profit 
in 1994 dropped in real value by 57 % in comparison to 1992. 
The gross profit is the basis for the calculation of yet another enterprise’s condition 
micro-economic indicator. The return of equity (Table 19) is the relation between the 
enterprise’s profit and its own funds, and it expresses the ability of a given sector to 
development. Since 1992, a gradual improvement of the above indicator can be noticed, 
especially in the private sector enterprises. On this ground, we can conclude that the 
profitability of the private sector investments is increasing, which creates possibilities for a Income from the Privatisation of State Enterprises... 
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quicker development. Increase of the number of people employed in the private sector and 
the tax revenues increase flowing to the State budget, that may even have a more significant 
importance than indirect income, are the effects of the quicker development. Thus, we can 
conclude, that the public sector does not create so many possibilities for the economy 
development  as the private sector does. So, we should aim at including other fields of the 
economy, still in the hands of the State, in the process of privatisation 
The biggest increase of the return of equity in the private sector appeared in industry, 
trade and transport. Negative values appeared only in the public sector in the building 
industry and in the private sector in communication (where the profitability of the public 
sector is 10 times bigger than the average in the whole economy). 
 
Table 19: Capital return rate in private sector enterprises in the main 
departments of economy. 
 Total  Industry  Building 
industry 
Transport Trade 
1992  0.02 0.07 1.57 0.21 0.13 
1993  0.06 0.12 1.86 0.72 0.28 
1994  0.11 0.46 1.47 0.80 0.37 
Source: Wyniki finansowe podmiot￿w gospodarczych za IV kwartał 1991, 92, 93, 94r., 
Bilansowe wyniki finansowe podmiot￿w gospodarczych za 1991, 92, 93, 94r., GUS, 
Warsaw. 
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2.1. Indirect income from privatisation originating from indirect 
tax revenues, in Poland. 
  The increasing income obtained from the sale of private sector enterprises is the basis 
for the increase of budgetary revenues acquired from indirect taxes. 
 The income obtained from the private sector sale increased twice, while from the 
public sector insignificantly (by 7 %). In total, income from the sale of products increased 
by 14 % in the analysed period. The real income increase obtained from the sale of products 
can be indebted only to the private sector, as the sale in the public sector remained at the 
same level (approximately) in the years 1992 - 1994. 
  The increase of real income acquired from the sale of products in the private sector 
increases its tax potential. The expanding private sector creates more possibilities for the 
increase of budgetary revenues from indirect taxes (generally VAT), in comparison with the 
public sector. The State still owns, subject to high excise duty tax, tobacco
40 and spirit 
industry. That is why the participation of the public sector in the budgetary revenues from 
indirect taxes is still enormous and it exceeds private sector, which has developed most 
quickly in those branches of the economy that are free from the excise duty tax and VAT. 
Table 20: Income from the products sale of all enterprises in the public and 
private sectors between 1991 - 1994. Bln PLZ. 
  Income from sale at actual price  Income from sale at prices as in 1991 
Total    
1991 974137  974137 
1992 1146900  828087 
1993 1444321  799292 
1994 2189632  944621 
Public sector     
1992 905317  653658 
1993 1068769  591460 
1994 1411864  609087 
Private sector     
1992 241583  174428 
1993 375551  207831 
1994 777768  335534 
Source: Wyniki finansowe podmiot￿w gospodarczych za IV kwartał 1991, 92, 93, 94r., 
Bilansowe wyniki finansowe podmiot￿w gospodarczych za 1991, 92, 93, 94r., GUS, 
Warsaw. Own calculation. 
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Table 21: Real income from the sale (at prices as in 1991) in chosen departments 
of the private sector between 1992 1994. Bln PLZ. 
 Total  Industry  Building 
industry 
Transport Trade 
1991  174428 83328 32210  6843 19510 
1993  207831  117228 34036  7724 16525 
1994  335534  181342 50642 17142 24715 
Real increase 
from 1992 
92 %  117 %  57 %  150 %  26 % 
Source: Wyniki finansowe podmiot￿w gospodarczych za IV kwartał 1991, 92, 93, 94r., 
Bilansowe wyniki finansowe podmiot￿w gospodarczych za 1991, 92, 93, 94r., GUS, 
Warsaw. Own calculation. 
 




















  The biggest increase of real income in the private sector has been noticed in transport 
(2.5 times) and industry (by 117 %). Real income from product sale dropped by 50 % in 
public building industry, while it grew by 57 % in the private building industry. Particularly 
important is the increase of real revenues acquired from sale in the private trade and 
industry. Indirect taxes included in the prices of products sold by private entities, shall feed 
the State budget in a bigger extent than the public sector, which income from sale in trade 
and industry remained at the unchanged level since 1992. Real revenues, acquired from the 
product sale, increased in the public sector only in transport (by 40 %). This is the result of a 
high 22 % VAT tax for transport services. The increase of income acquired from the public 
transport sale created possibilities for the increase of revenues from indirect taxes in that 
sector, however, private transport obtained a more significant increase of income from sale. 
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Conclusion. 
 The fiscal crisis provoked by the system transformation in the direction of market 
economy, reflected itself in the high level of budget deficit in the countries of the 
Wyshegrad Group. This was clearly visible in Poland and Hungary. The budget deficit in 
those countries has increased mainly due to extensive growth of government expenses. In 
such a situation, preventive actions should have been undertaken in order to limit the 
increase of expenses, and simultaneously, to enlarge the central budget income. The State 
enterprises’ privatisation is one of the factors that smoothens the effects of the fiscal crisis 
during a longer period of time. It influences the budget income side (income from sale and 
tax revenues from private sector enterprises), as well as the expenses side (by eliminating 
State subventions for State enterprises). 
   Direct income from privatisation contributing to the State budget does not have 
crucial meaning in balancing budget deficit in Poland and Hungary. Pecuniary means 
obtained from the sale of State property do not compensate in full extent lost revenues from 
dividends on the initial fund of privatised enterprises in Poland. Nevertheless the private 
sector development, the increase of real budgetary revenues from the income tax 
contributed by private sector legal persons did not cover losses evoked by the public sector 
tax revenues decrease. It could be concluded, not taking into consideration improving 
financial results of private sector enterprises, that privatisation evoked short-term 
diminution of State budgetary revenues in Poland. 
 The analysis performed in the hereby study confirms that the private sector creates 
more development  possibilities for highly profitable sectors of the economy, thus, more 
significant increase of budgetary revenues than the public sector and due to the tax revenues 
constitutes a source of means smoothening the fiscal crisis effects. 
 The improvement of the profitability and gross profit indicators of enterprises, as 
well as the increase of real income acquired from the sale of private sector products, 
strengthens their tax potential. As the result of improving the efficiency of privatised 
companies, income from tax revenues contributed by the private sector between 1991 - 
1994, increased by 6 times (in real value). Above all that, there was an on-going process of 
increased participation of the income tax contributed by private sector legal persons in the 
GDP, with a noticeable in 1994 drop in the participation of the private sector in the creation 
of GDP. 
 The higher return of equity in private sector enterprises confirms its bigger 
investment credibility than in the public sector. More rational utilisation of own funds by 
privatised companies encourages to investment, which in turn, creates possibility to enlarge 
the number of work places, and it not only limits unemployment, but it also influences the 
decrease of budget expenses. 
 In some states of the former USSR and Bulgaria, where the State enterprises’ 
privatisation process is executed at a much slower pace than in the Wyshegrad Group 
countries, the financial condition of enterprises and the resulting public finances condition, 
is much more complicated. This can be an additional argument "for" the presented 
hypothesises. Income from the Privatisation of State Enterprises... 
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  The following conclusions can be drawn from the performed above analysis, dealing 
with budgetary revenues from privatisation in Poland: 
1. Whereas, direct income from State enterprises privatisation is insignificant and it does 
not have a crucial meaning in the budget deficit balancing, and the participation of tax 
revenues contributed by private sector enterprises increases the total of budget income, 
thus the privatisation should be executed quickly, irrespective of the sale price. 
2. Conclusion drawn from the experience of the privatisation in the Czech Republic; 
quick, non-equivalent privatisation helps to increase income from privatisation in a 
bigger extent than the capital privatisation in Poland or Hungary. Income from the 
privatisation of big, State enterprises in the Czech Republic has been few times higher 
than revenues in the remaining countries of the Wyshegrad Group. 
3. Indirect income from privatisation appeared to play a significant role in State budget 
balancing and in smoothening the fiscal crisis effects.  
4. The privatisation of the economy, through the increase of indirect revenues contributed 
by private sector enterprises, meaningfully  smoothened the decrease of fiscal revenues 
of the State budget in Poland. 
 M. Antczak 
CASE Foundation  42
References 
Antczak, Małgorzata (1995): Zarys proces￿w prywatyzacyjnych w Republice Czech, 
CASE, Warsaw. 
Antczak, Rafał (1994): Prywatyzacja kapitałowa w Polsce i na Węgrzech w okresie 
transformacji gospodarczej 1990 - 1993r. Skutki finansowe makro i mikroekonomiczne. 
Uniwersytet Warszawski Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych. Master’s Thesis under the 
guidance of Prof.Wojciech Maciejewski. Warsaw. 
Barbone, Luca, D.J. Marchetti (1994): Transition and the Fiscal Crisis in Central 
Europe CASE, Studies and Analyses No 40, Warszawa. 
Barbone, Luca (1995): MultiQuery Database: A Tool for Cross-Country Comparisons, 
The World Bank, Washington 
Bilansowe wyniki finansowe podmiot￿w gospodarczych za lata 1991 - 1994, GUS, 
Warszawa. 
Błaszczyk, B., Bratkowski, A.S, Dąbrowski, M. (1996): Eastern Europe’s Tiger - 
Poland, Bank Austria, Vienna. 
Bratkowski, Andrzej S. and others (1995): Fiscal Polisy in Poland under Transition, 
CASE, Studies and Analyses No 49, Warsaw. 
Buchtikova, Alena, (1995): Privatisation in the Czech Republic, Studies and Analyses 
No 53, CASE, Warsaw. 
Buchtikova, Alena (1995): The Impact of the Privatisation Process to the Employment 
Situation in the Czech Republic, Prague 
Frydman, R., Rapaczyński, A., Earle, J.S. (1994): Proces Prywatyzacji w Europie 
Środkowej, Central European University, Warszawa 1994. 
Jermakowicz, Władysław (1994): Voucher Privatisation in Czechoslovakia: a Few 
Lessons. 
Kawalec, Stefan (1989): Privatisation of the Polish Economy, Communist Economies 
vol. 1, No. 3. 
Klacek, J., Hrncir, M. (1994): Polityka makroekonomiczna: Stabilizacja i 
transformacja w byłej Czechosłowacji i Republice Czeskiej, Instytut Ekonomii Narodowy 
Bank Czech, Praga. 
Ludanyi, Arnold (1995): Brief Overview of Hungarian Privatisation Transition, 
CASE, Studies and Analyses No 60, Warszawa. 
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: The Czech and Slovak Republics. 1994, Paris. Income from the Privatisation of State Enterprises... 
CASE Foundation  43
Orenstein, M., Brom, K. (1994): The Privatised Sector in the Czech Republic: 
Government and Bank Control in a Transition Economy, Europa-Asia Studies. 
Privatisation Newsletter of the Czech Republic & Slovakia, IES. 
Schwarz, G., Stone, M., Tessa von der Willingen (1993): Beyond Stabilisation: The 
Economic Transformation of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, International Monetary 
Fund. 
Stepanek, Pavel and others (1995): Fiscal Polisy in the Czech Republic under 
Transition CASE, Studies and Analyses 51, Warsaw. 
Thieme, Jerzy (1994): The Role of the Mass Privatisation in the Transformation of the 
Post-Communist Economies. Comparison of Poland and the Czech Republic, Istanbul.  
Wyniki finansowe podmiot￿w gospodarczych za IV kwartał lat 1991 - 1994, GUS, 
Warsaw. 